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Justifying Top Management Pay in a Transitional Economy 
1. Introduction 
China’s transition from a centrally-planned economy to a market driven economy has been 
well documented in the literature. In particular, the sustained growth in GNP and the dismantling of 
the old communist central planning apparatus have been widely lauded by economists and investors 
everywhere. However, until 2006, the strong economic growth was juxtaposed with poor corporate 
performance based on accounting numbers and stock market returns (Chen, Firth, and Rui 2006a). 
In our sample period, 2000 to 2005, corporate profitability improves although stock returns are 
often negative. A number of factors have placed constraints on firms’ performances, including the 
state’s continuing ownership interest in listed firms and the lack of monitoring of, and the absence 
of incentives for, top management.1 Old socialist principles still underlie the running of many listed 
firms and these may have lingering effects on economic efficiency. Manifestations of these 
principles include the quest for full employment and pay equality between top management and the 
average worker. One might expect these principles to die harder in state controlled listed firms than 
in privately controlled listed firms. 
 Our objective in this paper is to examine top management compensation in China’s listed firms. 
The design of compensation systems is a reflection of a firm’s corporate governance and has been 
the focus of much research in the U.S. and other developed economies.2 This research has 
examined, among other things, whether pay depends on performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990; 
Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999; Conyon and Murphy 2000; Bebchuk and Fried 2006); the role 
of corporate governance, including board structure and ownership, on compensation (Cheung, 
Stouraitas, and Wong 2005; Core et al. 1999; Bebchuk and Fried 2006); and whether behavioral 
theories (e.g., tournament theory or relative depravation theory) can help explain the disparity 
                                                 
1 By state we mean central, regional, and municipal government as well as state ministries and wholly government 
owned enterprises. 
2 According to Warren Buffet, the way a CEO is compensated is a key test of a firm’s commitment to good governance 
(letter to the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., February 2004). Thus, we can draw insights into a firm’s 
governance by examining top management pay. Buffet opines that he is disappointed in the governance of many firms. 
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between the top manager’s pay and the compensation of other managers and workers (e.g., Bloom 
1999; Bognanno 2001; Main, O’Reilly, and Wade 1993; Jirjahn and Kraft 2007; Lazear 1991; 
Rajgopal and Srinivasan 2008; Bebchuk, Cremers, and Urs 2008). In this paper, we revisit these 
questions using data from China. In particular, we examine the determinants of pay levels, the pay 
of top management relative to the average worker, and pay and performance sensitivities and 
elasticities. .  
The listed company sector of the economy has grown dramatically and by 2009 there were 
now more than 1500 listed firms with a market capitalization exceeding U.S.$3 trillion, which made 
it the second largest in the world. Moreover, China has opened up its economy to allow foreigners 
to invest in its listed firms and to allow full control of firms by foreigners. The changes in the 
investment landscape call out for research into the way firms operate and, in our case, how top 
management is compensated. 
 We find that a firm’s performance has a positive impact on top management compensation. A 
1000 RMB increase in stockholder wealth results in a 0.0038 RMB increase in the top manager’s 
pay.3 This result is similar to the pay performance sensitivities in U.S. firms during the 1970s 
(Murphy 1999). We also find that the pay disparity between top managers and the average worker is 
partially explained by a firm’s stock returns and profitability. Thus, any move away from egalitarian 
pay is justified by performance. The positive pay-performance relation applies to firms regardless of 
who the major stockholder is.  
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the institutional background of China’s 
modern enterprise reforms. This section describes the general framework for setting top executive 
pay in China and introduces the research questions that we investigate. We present the research 
design in section 3 and describe the sample, variable selection, and the regression models. Section 4 
describes the results of the pay levels tests and the pay and performance relations. Section 5 
                                                 
3 Eight RMB equals one U.S. dollar during the time period of our study. In 2010, the exchange rate has changed to 
seven RMB to one U.S. dollar. 
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presents conclusions. 
2. Institutional background 
At the beginning of the reform process, most listed firms were carved out of state owned 
enterprizes (SOEs). It was the profitable operating units of an SOE that were listed and the 
non-operating units (e.g., schools, hospitals), non-profitable units, and so-called ‘strategic units’ 
were retained by the SOE. When the profitable units were listed, the parent SOE typically kept 
voting control or else the voting control was passed to a unit of the state. Typically, the free float of 
shares was 25 to 30%. Over time, the state’s ownership has been reduced, but, even now, the state 
still remains the dominant owner of a majority of listed firms. However, some of the equity 
carve-out SOEs are now majority owned by a private investor. Additionally, there are a growing 
number of privately owned businesses that have become listed. 
A striking characteristic of the listed firms is that there is a single dominant owner, be it the 
state or private, which has effective control of the company. On average, the largest single investor 
owns 46% of a listed firm and the second largest investor owns about 7% (Chen, Firth, and Xu 
2009). We are therefore able to characterize a listed firm as state controlled or privately controlled 
depending on who the major stockholder is. Shleifer (1998), among others, argues that state 
ownership stifles the creative talents of management and forces firms to pursue policies that help 
meet government objectives rather than maximize economic efficiency and stockholder wealth. 
This might imply that state controlled and private controlled listed firms will monitor and 
incentivize their managers differently. In particular, extrapolating from prior studies (e.g., Shleifer 
1998) leads to a prediction that state controlled firms will not use profitability and stockholder 
wealth as performance measures in setting compensation or, if they do use these measures, they will 
place less weight on them vis-à-vis private firms. However, there are opposing views and some 
early evidence in China suggests the state does recognize the need to give incentives to 
management. For example, in the 1980s the government introduced a contract responsibility system 
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for SOEs where managers were rewarded if the SOE’s performance exceeded the targets specified 
in the contract (Chen et al. 2006a). Further evidence of the use of performance related pay for the 
managers of China’s SOEs (before the stock exchanges were opened) is given in Groves et al. (1994) 
and Mengistae and Xu (2004). Firth, Fung, and Rui (2006, 2007a), find mixed evidence on 
performance-related pay in China’s listed firms. Using data from 1998 to 2000, they find that pay is 
related to accounting performance but not to stock returns. Prior to the reform era, managers’ and 
workers’ cash compensation were similar although the managers also enjoyed perquisites that were 
not available to the general workers. After the reforms began, labor mobility increased as firms 
competed for the best managers. This leads to an increase in wage dispersion. 
 
2.1. Pay disparities 
 High pay disparities between different ranks of employees and managers, as exist in many 
firms in the U.S., can be explained by tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Main et al. 1993; 
Lynch 2005; Lee, Lev, and Yeo 2008; Kale, Reis, and Venkateswaren 2009). Here, pay disparities 
increase in the upper hierarchies of an organization. This creates strong incentives for lower level 
managers and employees to compete hard for promotion and they will exert substantial effort and 
commitment to win the tournament prize (the large increase in compensation that goes with the 
promotion). The increase in effort will benefit the firm’s stockholders. 
 Low pay disparity can be explained by relative depravation and distributive justice theories, 
which say lower level managers and employees feel aggrieved at the high pay of their superiors 
(Deutsch 1985; Henderson and Fredrickson 2001) and therefore cooperation declines in the 
organization. The resentment created by high pay disparities can jeopardize the firm’s profitability 
and efficiency (Dye 1984; Lazear 1989; Siegel and Hambrick 2005). An egalitarian approach, 
where pay differences between top managers and other workers are small, may lead to greater 
productivity (Bloom 1999; Drago and Garvey 1998; Levine 1991). However, there are 
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counter-arguments that compressed pay levels reduce incentives and lead to poor corporate 
performance (Hibbs and Locking 2000; Lallemand, Plasman, and Rycx 2004). 
 Pay disparity in China, while rising quite sharply in recent years, is nowhere near the levels 
observed for U.S. firms (Kim and Lu 2009). One reason for this is the state’s concern over social 
harmony. This is especially pertinent given China’s history and its continuing espousal of some 
socialist principles. There has been public unrest about the increasing compensation of executives at 
listed firms (SCMP 2006, 2009). 4  The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), which is a government unit that administers much of the state’s 
stockholdings in listed firms, announced plans to investigate the salary increases of senior 
executives of state controlled listed firms (SCMP 2007). In light of the importance of pay disparities 
in China, we analyze the variation in the pay of top executives in a listed firm relative to the average 
worker’s pay, and then examine if pay disparities can be explained by a firm’s performance. 
Presumably, pay disparities are more palatable for workers and for society as a whole if a firm’s 
performance is very good. 
 
2.2. How is top management compensation set? 
China’s Company Law (1993, as amended in 1999) and The Code of Corporate Governance 
for Listed Firms in China (The Code) issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC; the CSRC is the official regulator of securities markets and listed firms in China), set out 
the duties and obligations of the board of directors. One of the duties is to set top management pay 
including the compensation of the executive directors. As mentioned earlier, most listed firms have 
a controlling stockholder and this stockholder makes recommendations to the board on a variety of 
matters, including compensation. The right to make these recommendations is enshrined in The 
Code. Moreover, the largest shareholder is usually represented on the board and, in the case of 
                                                 
4 This public unrest is mirrored recently in the developed economies. For example, there is widespread outrage in the 
U.S. and Europe at the increases in top executive pay at firms that concurrently or subsequently report large losses, fire 
large parts of the workforce, and that receive financial assistance from the state. 
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private controlled firms, is often actively engaged in running the business. Chinese firms are also 
required to have supervisory boards although these are considered to be quite weak and ineffective 
(Tong 2003) and exert little influence on executive pay. The Code explicitly advocates the use of 
incentive based bonus compensation although it is silent on the measurement of performance and 
the bonus formulae. 
The state exerts some influence on top management pay and especially for state controlled 
listed firms. In 2009, the Ministry of Finance issued a circular to state owned listed firms in the 
finance sector asking them to reduce the compensation of top executives by at least 10% for firms 
that report increases in profits and by at least 20% for firms that report profit declines (SCMP 2009). 
The Ministry stated that the reduction in compensation is aimed at maintaining social equality, 
protecting the rights and interests of the nation and shareholders, and to improve corporate 
governance. In the eyes of the Ministry, the relative compensations of top managers are too high 
and they lead to public anger and resentment. This leads to pressure to reduce top management 
compensation at state controlled listed firms. However, the difference in managers’ pay reductions 
for profit-increasing and profit-decreasing firms signifies that the state recognizes a need for 
performance-differentiated pay. 
Top executives receive cash compensation in the form of a salary and a bonus. Stock options 
have only been allowed since 2008 and approval is required from the regulator (the CSRC) for the 
introduction of a scheme. One reason for the restriction on stock options is that there is no obvious 
source for the stock that would be issued once the options are exercised. Stock repurchases (the 
source of shares for stock option schemes in the U.S.) are not allowed and any new issue of stock 
requires regulatory approval, which is difficult to get. 
Another form of compensation for managers is perquisites. Perquisites include allowances for 
entertainment, traveling, training expenses, meeting expenses, and driver expenses. These 
allowances are granted to the executives and any unused allowances are typically pocketed by them. 
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This is an important source of income for managers and the pocketed perquisites (perks) could 
exceed the cash compensation in some firms. 
The Code lays out recommendations for governance (for example, since 2003 one third of 
directors need to be independent and the CSRC vets their claims of independence). While these are 
recommended guidelines they are de-facto law as the stock exchanges and the CSRC take 
disciplinary action if firms do not comply. Compensation committees became a requirement from 
the beginning of 2002.5 
 
2.3. Issues 
While our study is exploratory in nature, we nevertheless set out to examine a number of important 
issues. These issues include understanding the influence of ownership and governance on the setting 
of pay levels, evaluating the differences in pay between top management and wokers, and the 
relation between pay and performance. Top management pay relative to the average worker’s pay is 
a sensitive issue in China because of its impact on social harmony. Increased differences may be 
justified by superior firm performance and so we examine this issue. Agency theory predicts that 
effective reward systems that relate pay to performance, will enhance firm value. We therefore 
examine pay sensitivities and elasticities.  
Overall, China has experienced high rates of economic growth and the development of legal, 
financial, institutional, and governance environments has been very rapid. However, the market 
development has not been equal across China’s regions. In fact there is tremendous variation in the 
degree of market development and some regions in China’s hinterland are little changed since the 
beginning of the reforms. Chen et al. (2006b) and Firth, Fung, and Rui (2007b) find that regional 
differences can have a profound effect on fraud, the informativeness of accounting reports, and 
other corporate events. With this in mind, we examine whether the level of market development has 
                                                 
5 To examine whether the introduction of compensation committees has an effect on our results we partition our sample 
into observations from 1999 to 2001 and those from 2002 to 2005. We find the results are similar across the two 
sub-periods. 
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an impact on the pay-performance relation and the pay disparity-performance relation.6 
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Sample 
Our sample is non-financial companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges 
(China’s two stock markets) in the period 2000 to 2005. Although firms have been required to 
publish top executive pay since 1998, many of them did not comply with the regulations in the first 
two years and so we begin collecting data in 2000. The data on compensation and company 
characteristics are collected from the CSMAR database and from annual reports. Missing data 
substantially reduce the number of observations we can use and the final sample size is 4,233 
firm-years. Information on perquisites (perks) is hand collected from firms’ financial statements. 
Firms disclose the total perks paid but do not identify the names of those who receive them. We 
believe most of the perks are paid to the top management. 
The total of the executive directors’ compensation has to be disclosed in a firm’s financial 
statements. This compensation is salary and bonus; unfortunately most firms do not distinguish 
between salary and bonus and instead they report one lump sum. In the later years of our sample 
period the pay of the CEO or managing director is disclosed but the data are incomplete in the 
earlier years. Firms also disclose the collective pay of the three highest paid directors and we use 
the average of this pay as one of the dependent variables (there are more data on the pay of the three 
highest paid directors than the pay of the CEO and so we use the former).7 In China, the top 




                                                 
6 Our analysis of regional differences has its counterpart in international studies where research has investigated 
whether differences in corporate governance and institutional frameworks across countries affects a firm’s decisions.  
7 The average is computed as the total pay of the three highest paid directors, divided by three. 
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We use three dependent variables in the levels analyses. They are the log of the average 
compensation of the three highest paid executive directors (LnCOMP) and the average executive 
director’s compensation relative to the average worker’s pay, which we measure in two ways. First, 
we divide the average executive director’s pay for a firm divided by the average worker’s pay of the 
same firm; this is denoted ‘RelCOMP’. Second, we run a regression of COMP on the average 
worker’s pay and the cost of living of the province where the firm is located. Thus: 
0 1 2AverageCOMPCOMP COSTα β β= + +  (1) 
where COMP is the average compensation of the three highest paid executive directors, 
AverageCOMP is the average compensation of the workers of the firm, and COST is the regional 
cost of living per household. The coefficients are estimated for each two digit industry and for each 
year. The fitted values for the model for each firm-year are then compared to the actual pay and the 
difference is called abnormal compensation (AbnCOMP). AbnCOMP is used as our third dependent 
variable. Positive values of AbnCOMP indicate the top management is paid more than the “norm” 
and negative values imply managers are paid less than the “norm”.  
 We use two measures of performance in the levels tests. These are stock returns (RET) and 
return on assets (ROA).8 Stock return is the annualized rate of return for the year. Return on assets 
is operating income divided by total assets.9 We include a number of control variables in the 
regression models. These controls include variables that prior research has shown to be important in 
explaining the level of top executive pay. We use the standard deviation of stock return (SDRET) 
and return on assets (SDROA) as measures of risk. Log of board size (LnBoardSize), the proportion 
of independent directors (IndDir), and directors’ stockholdings (DirHolding) are included as 
governance variables. We use Log of total assets (Lnasset) as our measure of a firm’s size; firm size 
is theoretically and empirically linked to top management compensation (Gabaix and Landier 2008). 
                                                 
8 We also use return on sales and earnings per share as other measures of performance. These two variables give results 
that are similar to those for ROA and so we do not discuss them further. 
9 We also use net income as an alternative to operating income in sensitivity tests. As the results are qualitatively the 
same we do not separately tabulate them. 
 11
Leverage (DA) is total debt divided by total assets and the market to book ratio (MB) represents 
growth opportunities. 
 We include two additional variables in the regression which are important controls given the 
China context of our study. Private is a dummy variable that is coded one (1) if the controlling 
stockholder is a private entity or person; Private is coded zero (0) if the dominant stockholder is the 
state (central, regional, or municipal government or an associated ministry or agency). State 
controlled firms may be more subject to political interference and the managers are more likely to 
be political appointees or former civil servants. LnCost is the log of the annual cost of living in the 
region where the firm is located; these figures are taken from official government statistics. The 
cost of living may be a factor that helps explain compensation. Industry and year dummies are 
additional controls.10 Industry is based on the CSRC’s expanded list of industries. 
 
3.3. Regression models 
The general form of the regression models is as follows: 
0 1 2CONTROLSCOMP PERFβ β β= + +  (2) 
The three measures of compensation (LnCOMP, RelCOMP, and AbnCOMP) are described in 
the previous section. We run the regressions with both contemporaneously and lagged independent 
variables. As both sets of results are similar, we just report the results using contemporaneously 
measured independent variables. We do not use panel models because some of the variables (e.g., 
governance and ownership variables) do not change over time and so their impact will be 
washed-out in panel models. We use robust standard errors to correct for firm clustering, 
heterogeneity, and autocorrelation.  
In the pay and performance analyses we use change in compensation from one year to the next 
as the dependent variable. The independent variable is the change in performance. The models are: 
                                                 
10 Kim and Lu (2009) argue that inter-dependence in tasks can have an impact on pay dispersion and this impact varies 
across industries. Hence, we control for industry. 
 12
0 1COMP PERFβ β∆ = + ∆  (3) 
0 1lnCOMP LnPERFβ β∆ = + ∆  (4) 
Equation (3) is used to measure sensitivities and equation (4) is used to measure elasticities. 
PERF is stockholder wealth or operating income. 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 Panel A shows the means, medians, and standard deviations of the variables. The mean 
and median compensation for the highest paid executive director are 150,300 RIMB and 106,100 
RMB, respectively (this is the total pay for the three highest paid directors of a firm divided by 
three). Managers in private controlled listed firms have a higher mean but lower median 
compensation than top managers in state controlled listed firms. RelCOMP has a median of 3.42 
which indicates that the average top management pay is about three and a half times the wage of the 
average worker. This is much lower than in the U.S. (Hay Group 1991; Financial Times 2007; Kim 
and Lu 2009). On the face of it, pay disparity is low and this is consistent with the government’s 
avowed intent to avoid social disharmony created by wide wealth gaps. Even in private controlled 
firms, the compensation disparity is quite small (mean and median RelCOMP are 6.18 and 4.16 for 
private firms and 4.67 and 3.17 for state firms). However, RelCOMP is statistically significantly 
higher for private compared to state controlled listed firms. AbnCOMP is a measure of abnormal 
relative compensation used in our regression models. The negative signs on AbnCOMP for 
state-owned firms indicate that the compensation of the top managers relative to the average worker 
is lower than in private controlled listed firms. 
TABLE 1 HERE 
In the levels analyses, our performance measures, RET and ROA, are industry-adjusted. Here, 
we deduct the median industry performance from the firm’s performance number to obtain a 
relative performance measure for the firm. Relative performance abstracts away economic and 
 13
industry trends and reflects the success of the firm’s top managers vis-à-vis their competitors. We 
use the CSRC industrial classification to define industry membership. The performance metrics of 
state-owned listed firms are similar to those of the private firms; this finding is similar to Chen et al. 
(2009).  
On average, state controlled firms are larger than private controlled firms. The average MB 
ratios (mean = 3.01 and median = 2.42) reflect strong growth opportunities. Private controlled firms 
have higher MB ratios. Directors’ shareholdings are very low. Table 1 also shows COMP, RelCOMP, 
and AbnCOMP by year (Panel C), industry (Panel D), and province (Panel E). Compensation and 
relative compensation has increased (Panel C) over the six years of the study. Pay disparity 
(CompRel) is high in the textiles and apparel industry and low in other manufacturing industries 
and power, gas, and water (Panel D). There are some compensation and relative compensation 
differences across regions (Panel E). We control for location in the regressions by using the cost of 
living (LnCost) for each region. 
We show the correlation matrix in Table 2; in general, the correlations among the dependent 
variables are low. Variance inflation factors are quite small in the regression models and so 
multicollinearity is unlikely to be a major factor in interpreting the coefficients. 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
4.2. Regression results 
Table 3 gives the regression results for the levels analyses. LnCOMP is significantly and 
positively related to industry adjusted stock returns and to industry adjusted profitability. Top 
executive pay therefore depends on a firm’s performance.  We examine this issue in greater depth 
in Table 4 where we calculate pay and performance sensitivities and elasticities. The negative signs 
on the risk variables, SDRET and SDROA, indicate that if a firm’s performance is more variable 
than that of their competitors (we use relative performance measures), then the top managers 
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receive lower compensation. Private controlled listed firms pay their top managers more than do 
state controlled listed firms. As expected, size (LnAsset) and cost of living (LnCost) are positively 
associated with compensation. There is a positive and significant relation between directors’ 
stockholdings and compensation. Higher stockholdings may indicate that the directors have more 
power and can use this to pay themselves more. Firms with foreign listings pay higher 
compensation to their top managers. 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 Table 3 also shows the results for top executive compensation relative to the average wage 
(RelCOMP and AbnCOMP). Stock returns (RET) and operating profit performance (ROA) are 
significantly and positively related to the pay disparities (relative pay) in firms. This suggests that a 
managers’ high pay relative to the average worker is being justified by reference to a firm’s superior 
industry adjusted performance. Given the egalitarian nature of China’s socialist past, high 
management compensation draws very negative publicity. Strong financial performance relative to 
the industry norm might help justify high pay disparities. Private controlled firms have higher pay 
disparities. One reason for this is that the state’s desire for social harmony through pay parity 
(SCMP 2009) has less influence in private firms. Large firms have higher pay dispersion and this 
may reflect a larger number of hierarchies in the organization.  The results also show that firms 
located in regions with low costs of living have higher AbnComp and directors’ shareholdings are 
positively related to AbnComp. 
 
4.3. The pay and performance relation 
 Following Murphy (1985, 1999) we examine pay-performance sensitivities and 
pay-performance elasticities. For the sensitivity analyses, we regress change in pay (∆COMP) on 
change in performance. As is standard in the literature, we express the change in pay for a 
1000RMB change in shareholder wealth or a 1000 RMB change in operating profit. We also 
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examine pay-performance elasticities. Here, we regress the change in log pay (∆LnCOMP) on the 
change in log performance.  
We use two measures of performance. These are change in stockholder wealth (∆SW) and 
change in operating income (∆OI). For elasticities we use the change in log wealth (∆LnSW) and 
change in log operating income (∆LnOI). Shareholder wealth is the change in a firm’s market 
capitalization plus dividends paid out. Market capitalization is the share price times the number of 
shares outstanding at the beginning of the year. Operating income excludes non-core income, 
special items, and taxes. However, in sensitivity tests, we use net income as a replacement for 
operating income and find that the results are similar. 
 Table 4 gives the regression results for pay-performance sensitivities. Sensitivities are shown 
in Panel A and elasticities in Panel B. ∆SW and ∆OI have positive and significant coefficients in the 
∆COMP regressions. As ∆COMP is in thousands and ∆SW is in millions, we interpret the 
coefficient of 0.0039 as a top manager receiving an additional 0.0039 RMB in pay per 1000 RMB 
increase in stockholder wealth. As a comparison, Murphy (1999) reported an additional CEO pay of 
0.4 cents per $1000 increase in stockholder wealth for U.S. firms in the 1970s. The sensitivity rose 
to 1.4 cents in the 1990s. Thus, the sensitivity of pay to performance for Chinese firms in 
2000-2005 is similar to that in the U.S. in the 1970s. Change in pay is also sensitive to changes in 
operating income. A 1000 RMB increase in operating income gives 0.0304 RMB increase in pay. 
The evidence shows that pay depends on performance. Using data from 1998 to 2000, Firth et al. 
(2005) find that the pay of top managers is sensitive to operating performance but not to shareholder 
wealth. Our results from a later period show that managers are now rewarded on the basis of 
increasing stockholder wealth. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
 In order to see if the sensitivities are different between private controlled and state firms we 
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interact ∆SW and ∆OI with Private, which is a dummy variable coded one if the listed firm is 
controlled by a private investor. While the interaction terms are positive they are not significant at 
conventional levels. Thus, there is no significant evidence that private controlled firms have higher 
pay-performance sensitivities.  
 In panel B, we show the elasticities. The coefficients on ∆LnSW and ∆LnOI are positive and 
statistically significant. A one percent increase in SW leads to a 0.71 percent increase in top 
management pay. There is no significant difference in pay and performance elasticities between 
private controlled and state controlled listed firms. 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
4.4. The impact of regional development on compensation 
As discussed in section 2.3., there are vast regional differences in China with respect to market 
development. In order to see if regional development has an impact on the pay-performance 
sensitivities and elasticities, we divide our sample into firms located in the more developed 
provinces and those located in the less developed provinces. To operationalize this procedure, we 
make use of a regional development index compiled by China’s National Economic Research 
Institute (NERI).  
The market development index captures the following aspects: (1) the relations between 
government and markets, such as the role of markets in allocating resources and enterprise burden 
in addition to normal taxes; (2) the development of non-state business, such as the ratio of industrial 
output by the private sector to total industrial output; (3) development of product markets, including 
considerations such as regional trade barriers; (4) development of factor markets such as FDI and 
mobility of labor; (5) development of market intermediaries and the legal environment (e.g., the 
protection of property rights). A high index score signifies a province with a strong and well 
established market development (good law enforcement, strong institutional investors, etc.). Fan 
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and Wang (2003) give an extensive description of the index. Based on this index, we call a province 
with an above median score a “more developed region” and firms in these provinces are examined 
separately from firms in provinces with below median market development scores (“less developed 
region”). 
We classify regions as more developed if the market development index is above the median of 
and we classify other regions as less developed. We re-run the pay and performance relation 
regressions for those firms located in more developed regions and for those firms located in less 
developed regions. The results are shown in Table 5, panel A, for more developed regions and in 
Table 5, panel B, for less developed regions. 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
 The results in Panel A (for firms located in more developed regions) are similar to the results in 
Table 4 (all firms). One exception is that the ∆LnSW*Private coefficient is negatively significant. 
This suggests compensation sensitivity to change in stockholder wealth is lower for private 
controlled firms in well developed regions. In Panel B (firms located in less developed regions), 
∆OI and ∆LnSW have the expected positive signs but they are not statistically significant.  
 
4.5. Perquisites 
Our final analyses examine the perquisites data. There are several studies using U.S. data and 
most of them conclude that perks are wasteful11. Yermack (2006) finds that a CEO’s perks are not 
related to their cash and stock option compensation but are negatively related to stock returns. 
Bebchuk and Fried (2006) describe managers’ perks as camouflaged compensation that tries to 
avoid the scrutiny of stockholders and investors; they conclude that perks are unrelated to a 
                                                 
11 Lavelle and Grover (2005) and Hodgson (2004) give examples of management perks in the U.S., which they view as 
being wasteful. However, one study by Rajan and Wulf (2006) concludes that perks are a way to help superior managers 
become more productive. 
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manager’s performance. Grinstein, Weinbaum, and Yehuda (2009) find that the stock market reacts 
negatively to announcements of perks in the U.S. and therefore shareholder value is reduced. 
Andrews, Lin, and Yi (2009) provide similar evidence. In China, perks are often in the form of cash 
(e.g., cash allowances for travel, cash allowances for entertainment), and surpluses (i.e., allowances 
minus expenditures) are often pocketed by the top executives. Based on an analysis of a few cases 
known to the authors we believe the proportion of surplus to total allowances is similar across 
firms.  
We investigate the determinants of perks compensation in Table 6. The first two columns relate 
to the log of perks only (LnPERK) and columns 3 and 4 relate to abnormal perks (AbnPERK). 
Abnormal perks is the residual from a regression of perks on a firm’s size (log of sales), number of 
countries the firm operates in or sells to, and the number of industry segments the firm operates in. 
These factors are expected to help explain perks and the residuals represent abnormal perks.  
LnPERK and AbnCOMP are not related to performance. Perks (or excessive perks) are 
compensation but because they are not ‘direct’ and are not publicly linked to named executives, 
managers may feel there is no need to justify them (i.e., the compensation is “disguised” or 
camouflaged as business expenses).12 The non-significant coefficients on the performance variables 
do not support Rajan and Wulf’s conclusion (from the U.S.) that perks are a valuable incentive. 
Older firms pay higher perks while firm size has no significant association with LnPerk and 
AbnPerk. Table 6 shows that the coefficients on Private are not statistically significant. Thus, there 
is no statistical evidence that state owned listed firms have higher perks.  
In Table 7 we show the perks and performance relation. LnPERKS is not related to 
performance. The Private interaction terms are not significant. 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 
                                                 
12 Unfortunately, we are unable to determine exactly what amount of the perks is compensation and what the legitimate 
business expenses are. Neither are we able to individually identify who receives the perks compensation. These data 
problems represent limitations to our research.  
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5. Summary and conclusions 
 Top management pay has been and continues to be a focus of fierce debate among academics, 
practitioners, and the public at large. At the forefront of the debates is how to properly incentivize 
top managers and how to prevent abuses by management. The focus of our study is the 
compensation of top management in China’s listed firms. To date, comparatively little 
compensation research has been conducted using Chinese data. 
 Our sample data are from 2000 to 2005 and so we cover the later period of the economic 
reforms. Top management compensation is low by international and even regional standards. Part of 
this is explained by the low cost of living in China. Another explanation is that firms are adhering to 
the government’s call for social harmony by keeping pay disparities between top management and 
workers comparatively low. The median management to worker pay is just 3.42. However, these 
conclusions are tempered by the fact that top managers receive perquisites which we believe often 
end up in the managers’ pockets. We therefore include perks in our tests although the highly 
aggregated nature of the data places limits on our tests. 
 We find that there is a positive relation between pay and performance. The sensitivity of pay to 
increases in stockholder wealth is similar to that in the U.S. in the 1970s. Pay disparity is positively 
related to performance and this suggests performance is used to justify top managers earning a lot 
more than the average employee; this justification is important in the transition from a centrally 
planned socialist system to a market based economy. Performance also explains changes in 
compensation. 
 Our results show that private controlled firms pay more to their top management after 
accounting for other factors. However, the variables that are significant in explaining compensation 
are the same for both private controlled and state controlled firms. China is characterized as having 
great disparities in wealth and market development across different regions of the country. However, 
our results are robust to the different levels of market development. We also carry out some 
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preliminary analyses on the levels of perquisites and find that they are not dependent on a firm’s 
performance. However, there are caveats to working with perks data and so a more complete 
analysis awaits future research. 
 Our study is exploratory in nature as there are few stylized facts about top management 
compensation in China and the data lack the necessary detail to carry out certain tests. Nevertheless, 
we have been able to summarize some important characteristics of executive compensation and 
examine the determinants of pay and pay disparities. Our research has also identified a number of 
issues that future research can address if and when appropriate data become available. 
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Comp is the average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors (‘000,000). LnComp is the log value of the 
average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors.  CompRel is the ratio of the average annual 
compensation of the three highest paid directors to the average annual salary of an employee (total cash paid to 
employees to total number of employees).  AbnComp is abnormal compensation (‘000,000). LnCompPerk is the log 
value of total annual compensation and perk consumption of directors. LnPerk is log value of perk compensation. 
AbnPerk is abnormal perk (‘000,000). Perk compensation includes administrative expenses, traveling expenses, 
business entertainment expenses, communication expenses, overseas training expenses, director meeting expenses, 
driver expenses and bonus for directors. RET is industry-adjusted cumulative daily raw return for the year.  SDRET is 
the standard deviation of the daily raw return for the year.  ROA is industry-adjusted return on assets.  SDROA is the 
standard deviation of return on assets for five years. ROS is industry-adjusted return on sales.  SDROS is the standard 
deviation of return on sales for five years. EPS is industry-adjusted earnings per share.  SDEPS is the standard 
deviation of earnings per share for five years. BoardSize is the number of directors on the board. LnBoardSize is the log 
value of the number of directors on the board.  IndDir is the percentage of the number of independent directors to total 
number of directors on the board. LnAsset is the log value of total assets.  LnCost is the log value of the living 
expenditure level of the province where the firm is located.  LnFirmAge is the log value of the number of years the 
firm has been established.  DA is the ratio of debt to total assets. MB is the ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of equity. DirHolding is the percentage of director shareholdings to total shares outstanding.  Foreign is the 
proportion of firms that have a foreign listing. CompChg is the change in average annual compensation of the three 
highest paid directors. CompRelChg is the change in the ratio of the average annual compensation for the three highest 
paid directors to the average annual salary of an employee. AbnCompChg is the change in abnormal compensation.  
ROAChg is the change in industry-adjusted return on assets.  ROSChg is the change in industry-adjusted return on 
sales.  EPSChg is the change in industry-adjusted earnings per share.  LnAssetChg is the change in total assets. 
DAChg is the change in debt to total assets.  MBChg is the change in the ratio of market value of equity to book value 
of equity.  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Levels Regression Model            
 All Firms State-Owned Firms Privately-Owned Firms
 N = 4233 N = 3124 N = 1109 











Comp 0.1530 0.1061 0.1697 0.1481 0.1066 0.1522 0.1543 0.0967 0.1996 
LnComp 11.5296 11.5721 0.9237 11.5290 11.5918 0.9180 11.5324 11.5096 0.9408 
CompRel 5.0641 3.4183 5.3550 4.6699 3.1687 4.8428 6.1785 4.1593 6.4635 
AbnComp -0.0013 -0.0259 0.2321 -0.0044 -0.0268 0.2265 0.0075 -0.0229 0.2472 
LnCompPerk 15.6095 15.6231 1.8781 15.6602 15.7150 1.8561 15.4649 15.3892 1.9333 
LnPerk 12.7771 15.8662 7.0068 12.8933 15.9353 6.9482 12.4428 15.6592 7.1664 
AbnPerk -0.4241 -1.3738 7.7519 -0.6211 -1.3322 7.3039 0.1422 -1.4937 8.8957 
RET 0.0155 -0.0026 0.2588 0.0210 -0.0008 0.2590 0.0006 -0.0088 0.2578 
SDRET 0.0234 0.0227 0.0069 0.0233 0.0226 0.0072 0.0236 0.0231 0.0058 
ROA 0.0117 0.0001 0.0705 0.0131 0.0012 0.0702 0.0079 -0.0030 0.0715 
SDROA 0.0329 0.0262 0.0264 0.0326 0.0257 0.0264 0.0338 0.0278 0.0263 
ROS 0.0128 -0.0013 0.1266 0.0033 -0.0078 0.1172 0.0394 0.0206 0.1469 
SDROS 0.0642 0.0448 0.0766 0.0597 0.0427 0.0727 0.0768 0.0516 0.0854 
EPS 0.0191 0.0003 0.2803 0.0260 -0.0003 0.2825 -0.0003 0.0033 0.2734 
SDEPS 0.0390 0.0053 0.1630 0.0335 0.0050 0.1284 0.0545 0.0062 0.2339 
BoardSize 9.7407 9.0000 2.2372 9.9294 9.0000 2.2891 9.2087 9.0000 1.9937 
LnBoardSize 2.2508 2.1972 0.2257 2.2699 2.1972 0.2262 2.1971 2.1972 0.2156 
IndDir 0.2661 0.3333 0.1290 0.2626 0.3333 0.1290 0.2759 0.3333 0.1288 
LnAsset 21.2465 21.1595 0.8826 21.3538 21.2654 0.8996 20.9459 20.9217 0.7572 
LnCost 8.8549 8.7123 0.2843 8.8589 8.7123 0.2920 8.8443 8.7123 0.2615 
LnFirmAge 1.7718 1.7918 0.5494 1.7702 1.7918 0.5403 1.7778 1.7918 0.5740 
DA 0.4741 0.4841 0.1726 0.4663 0.4759 0.1734 0.4964 0.5116 0.1686 
MB 3.0139 2.4265 1.9322 2.9343 2.3933 1.8462 3.2415 2.5248 2.1412 
DirHolding 0.0024 0.0001 0.0298 0.0006 0.0001 0.0069 0.0076 0.0001 0.0567 
Foreign 0.0884   0.1034   0.0460             
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Table 1 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Change Regression Model (N=2721)     
 Mean Median Standard Deviation
    
CompChg 0.2800 0.0997 0.8303 
CompRelChg 0.1582 -0.0140 0.9512 
AbnCompChg -0.3297 -0.1876 1.9173 
RET 0.0103 -0.0044 0.2684 
SDRET 0.0239 0.0232 0.0078 
ROAChg 0.0915 0.0053 0.6939 
SDROA 0.0320 0.0259 0.0251 
ROSChg 0.0626 0.0030 0.5718 
SDROS 0.0656 0.0448 0.0795 
EPSChg -0.0484 -0.0043 1.5743 
SDEPS 0.0495 0.0056 0.1935 
LnBoardSize 2.2496 2.1972 0.2204 
IndDir 0.2828 0.3333 0.1166 
LnAssetChg 0.1196 0.0760 0.2512 
LnCost 8.8500 8.7123 0.2818 
LnFirmAge 1.8048 1.7918 0.5390 
DA 0.0800 0.0334 0.3635 
MB -0.1398 -0.2240 0.5016 
DirHolding 0.0019 0.0001 0.0259 
Foreign 0.0824     
 
Panel C: By Year       
 LnComp CompRel AbnComp (scaled by 1,000)         
 Mean Median Standard Deviation MeanMedian Standard Deviation Mean Median Standard Deviation
          
2000 10.42 10.37 0.79 2.71 2.21 2.56 -8.98 -8.74 710.59 
2001 11.11 11.11 0.87 4.33 2.99 4.57 -5.37 -22.67 81.95 
2002 11.39 11.44 0.84 4.73 3.52 4.62 -0.33 -23.64 113.60 
2003 11.63 11.66 0.85 5.34 3.76 5.27 2.06 -32.76 175.09 
2004 11.77 11.80 0.87 5.72 3.77 6.09 6.49 -34.86 176.88 




Table 1 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel D: By Industry     
 LnComp CompRel AbnComp (scaled by 1,000)          
 MeanMedian Standard Deviation 
MeanMedian Standard 
Deviation 
Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Agriculture 11.19 11.30 0.80 5.64 4.18 5.05 5.73 -3.95 71.70 
Mining 11.59 11.51 0.88 6.43 3.23 6.59 22.73 -23.16 139.33 
Food and Beverage 11.38 11.39 0.94 5.48 3.55 5.64 16.09 -20.50 159.77 
Textile and Apparel 11.50 11.50 0.92 7.65 4.95 8.57 10.31 -32.44 175.87 
Paper Making and Printing 10.92 10.94 0.98 3.98 3.45 2.40 -46.40 -43.10 51.63 
Petroleum, Chemicals and Plastics 11.20 11.25 0.96 4.80 3.25 5.08 -1.94 -21.93 118.17 
Electronics 11.82 11.83 0.83 6.16 4.25 5.12 -11.38 -38.10 170.77 
Metal and Non-metal 11.35 11.30 1.01 5.37 3.52 5.46 3.07 -38.14 167.60 
Machinery, Equipment and
instrument 
11.40 11.48 0.94 4.88 3.23 5.24 2.91 -27.47 180.58 
Medicine and Biological Product 11.74 11.80 0.88 6.22 4.28 5.92 6.13 -33.06 177.06 
Other Manufacturing Industries 11.41 11.45 0.80 2.55 1.86 1.80 -5.33 -20.56 66.14 
Power, Gas and Water 11.49 11.60 0.93 2.69 2.18 2.28 -4.75 -21.25 89.34 
Architecture 11.57 11.63 0.89 4.05 3.78 3.49 5.30 -28.13 135.91 
Transportation 11.73 11.75 0.82 3.60 2.78 4.16 -3.75 -21.47 126.93 
Information Technology 11.81 11.84 0.82 4.19 2.85 4.00 -15.39 -52.47 194.78 
Retail 11.78 11.76 0.82 5.21 4.17 4.42 -55.13 -11.66 659.56 
Real Estate 11.82 11.93 0.96 3.48 1.67 5.71 -0.87 -31.77 229.07 
Hotels, Tourism and Public Services 11.69 11.63 0.78 5.99 3.72 6.55 -1.24 -17.93 101.63 
Communication 11.32 11.33 0.52 3.43 1.82 3.19 -4.14 -22.13 62.38 




Table 1 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel E: By Province       
 LnComp CompRel AbnComp           
 Mean Median Standard Deviation MeanMedian Standard Deviation Mean Median Standard Deviation
Anhui 11.36 11.28 0.94 5.54 4.49 4.23 31.18 -6.00 129.98 
Beijing 11.95 11.85 0.86 4.86 3.06 5.81 24.59 -21.99 154.61 
Fujian 11.75 11.65 0.83 5.02 3.50 4.47 -55.23 -32.87 299.38 
Gansu 10.93 10.94 0.96 4.51 2.99 4.09 16.39 -19.77 423.40 
Guangdong 11.98 12.01 0.85 6.08 3.97 6.71 81.13 32.44 192.98 
Guangxi 11.85 11.98 0.83 6.20 5.17 4.89 11.43 -28.31 154.14 
Guizhou 11.22 11.27 0.93 4.65 3.28 4.74 -3.76 -18.21 97.26 
Hainan 11.21 11.15 0.85 3.42 3.15 3.11 -4.81 -33.73 115.88 
Hebei 11.35 11.31 0.91 4.43 3.17 4.13 2.96 -28.14 95.99 
Heilongjiang 11.04 11.00 0.91 5.03 3.40 5.02 56.17 -4.97 161.63 
Henan 11.50 11.38 1.01 6.99 4.73 6.07 -14.88 -10.86 280.81 
Hubei 11.31 11.41 0.87 6.00 4.75 5.04 26.28 -5.28 141.75 
Hunan 11.45 11.48 0.91 6.19 4.08 7.20 22.70 -28.46 257.45 
Inner Mongolia 11.04 10.99 1.02 5.04 2.86 6.73 21.39 -9.53 236.23 
Jiangsu 11.66 11.70 0.81 4.61 4.14 3.24 -6.10 -29.71 105.52 
Jiangxi 11.02 11.06 0.96 3.76 2.38 3.53 -22.64 -34.07 81.65 
Jilin 11.07 11.07 0.93 3.88 2.72 3.57 -15.63 -26.72 78.69 
Liaoning 11.21 11.35 0.92 4.36 2.79 5.46 -33.27 -46.06 87.70 
Ningxia 11.04 10.88 0.75 3.83 2.46 4.04 -44.02 -52.75 51.77 
Qinghai 10.77 10.58 0.79 2.59 1.68 2.83 -36.72 -39.19 59.09 
Shaanxi 11.01 10.91 0.67 5.24 2.85 5.67 1.18 -10.04 304.58 
Shandong 11.43 11.57 0.97 6.03 3.88 6.82 -5.32 -38.05 107.70 
Shanghai 11.82 11.85 0.77 3.70 2.56 4.19 -29.77 -33.75 226.40 
Shanxi 10.89 10.84 1.06 5.32 2.68 7.05 -56.63 -58.15 68.15 
Sichuan 11.17 11.16 0.87 4.53 3.11 4.62 -18.19 -26.11 67.83 
Tibet 11.37 11.24 0.54 5.30 3.97 3.37 24.79 -4.19 107.66 
Xinjiang 11.31 11.39 0.59 4.32 2.73 4.89 10.18 -32.64 170.50 
Yunnan 11.53 11.55 0.90 4.75 3.97 4.06 3.13 -42.11 249.33 






RET is industry-adjusted cumulative daily raw return for the year. SDRET is the standard deviation of the daily raw return for the year. ROA is 
industry-adjusted return on assets. SDROA is the standard deviation of return on assets for five years. ROS is industry-adjusted return on sales. SDROS is the 
standard deviation of return on sales for five years. EPS is industry-adjusted earnings per share. SDEPS is the standard deviation of earnings per share for five 
years. LnBoardSize is the log value of the number of directors on the board. IndDir is the percentage of the number of independent directors to total number of 
directors on the board. LnAsset is the log value of total assets. LnCost is the log value of the living expenditure level of the province where the firm is located. 
LnFirmAge is the log value of the number of years the firm has been established. DirHolding is the percentage of director shareholdings to total shares 
outstanding. Foreign is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm issues B-shares or H-shares and 0 otherwise. ROAChg is the change in 
industry-adjusted return on assets. ROSChg is the change in industry-adjusted return on sales. EPSChg is the change in industry-adjusted earnings per share. 
LnAsset is the change in total assets. DAChg is the change in debt to total assets. MBChg is the change in the ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity.  p-values are shown in parentheses. 
Panel A: Correlation Coefficients for Levels Regression Model             
 RET SDRET ROA SDROA ROS SDROS EPS SDEPS LnBoardSize IndDir Private LnAsset LnCost LnFirmAge DA MB DirHolding             
SDRET 0.102 1.000 -0.141 0.015 -0.080 0.151 -0.181 0.074 -0.051 0.062 0.031 -0.164 0.017 0.112 0.150 -0.039 0.025 
 (0.00) . (0.00) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.09) 
ROA 0.234 -0.141 1.000 0.376 0.391 -0.006 0.467 -0.068 0.027 0.041 -0.039 0.103 0.080 -0.030 -0.132 0.096 0.028 
 (0.00) (0.00) . (0.00) (0.00) (0.69) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.000 (0.06) 
SDROA 0.039 0.015 0.376 1.000 0.104 0.427 0.073 0.052 -0.009 -0.081 0.022 -0.074 0.070 0.231 0.003 0.186 -0.019 
 (0.01) (0.32) (0.00) . (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.53) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.83) (0.00) (0.20) 
ROS 0.130 -0.080 0.391 0.104 1.000 0.127 0.254 -0.098 -0.046 0.016 0.111 -0.045 -0.037 -0.089 -0.211 0.045 0.034 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) . (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
SDROS -0.001 0.151 -0.006 0.427 0.127 1.000 -0.094 0.063 -0.086 -0.146 0.108 -0.244 0.057 0.215 0.027 0.221 -0.033 
 (0.97) (0.00) (0.69) (0.00) (0.00) . (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.03) 
EPS 0.335 -0.181 0.467 0.073 0.254 -0.094 1.000 -0.109 0.061 0.046 -0.064 0.256 0.062 -0.107 -0.168 0.015 0.040 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) . (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.01) 
SDEPS -0.037 0.074 -0.068 0.052 -0.098 0.063 -0.109 1.000 -0.028 0.025 0.025 -0.101 0.004 0.080 0.152 -0.059 -0.005 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) . (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.00) (0.80) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.75) 
LnBoardSize 0.008 -0.051 0.027 -0.009 -0.046 -0.086 0.061 -0.028 1.000 -0.022 -0.146 0.208 0.052 -0.023 0.010 -0.052 -0.005 
 (0.60) (0.00) (0.08) (0.53) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) . (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.51) (0.00) (0.73) 
IndDir 0.020 0.062 0.041 -0.081 0.016 -0.146 0.046 0.025 -0.022 1.000 0.028 0.154 0.040 0.193 0.111 -0.432 0.057 
 (0.19) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.28) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.15) . (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Private -0.030 0.031 -0.039 0.022 0.111 0.108 -0.064 0.025 -0.146 0.028 1.000 -0.218 -0.024 0.017 0.090 0.047 0.102 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.06) . (0.00) (0.11) (0.24) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LnAsset 0.110 -0.164 0.103 -0.074 -0.045 -0.244 0.256 -0.101 0.208 0.154 -0.218 1.000 0.131 -0.037 0.147 -0.317 -0.025 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) . (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) 
LnCost 0.063 0.017 0.080 0.070 -0.037 0.057 0.062 0.004 0.052 0.040 -0.024 0.131 1.000 0.182 0.022 0.089 0.039 
 (0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.80) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) . (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.01) 
LnFirmAge 0.015 0.112 -0.030 0.231 -0.089 0.215 -0.107 0.080 -0.023 0.193 0.017 -0.037 0.182 1.000 0.200 -0.002 -0.114 
 (0.32) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.24) (0.01) (0.00) . (0.00) (0.87) (0.00) 
DA -0.006 0.150 -0.132 0.003 -0.211 0.027 -0.168 0.152 0.010 0.111 0.090 0.147 0.022 0.200 1.000 0.096 -0.022 
 (0.71) (0.00) (0.00) (0.83) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.51) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) . (0.00) (0.15) 
MB 0.187 -0.039 0.096 0.186 0.045 0.221 0.015 -0.059 -0.052 -0.432 0.047 -0.317 0.089 -0.002 0.096 1.000 -0.030 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.87) (0.00) . (0.05)             
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Table 2 (continued) 
Correlation Coefficients 
Panel A: Correlation Coefficients for Levels Regression Model (continued)               
 RET SDRET ROA SDROA ROS SDROS EPS SDEPS LnBoardSize IndDir Private Lnasset LnCost LnFirmAge DA MB DirHolding              
DirHolding -0.013 0.025 0.028 -0.019 0.034 -0.033 0.040 -0.005 -0.005 0.057 0.102 -0.025 0.039 -0.114 -0.022 -0.030 1.000 
 (0.38) (0.09) (0.06) (0.20) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.75) (0.73) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.01) (0.00) (0.15) (0.05) . 
Foreign 0.025 0.042 0.056 0.053 -0.012 0.008 -0.002 0.015 0.056 0.032 -0.081 0.223 0.223 0.151 0.014 0.063 -0.023 
 (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.61) (0.87) (0.33) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.13)                
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients for Change Regression Model             
 RET SDRET ROAChg SDROA ROSChg SDROS EPSChg SDEPS LnBoardSize IndDir Private LnAssetChg LnCost LnFirmAge DAChg MBChg DirHolding            
SDRET 0.130 1.000 0.033 0.016 0.030 0.118 -0.017 0.129 -0.060 0.012 0.018 -0.101 0.007 0.101 0.004 0.050 0.018 
 (0.00) . (0.07) (0.38) (0.10) (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50) (0.33) (0.00) (0.70) (0.00) (0.83) (0.01) (0.32) 
ROAChg 0.104 0.033 1.000 0.031 0.723 0.145 0.285 0.111 0.001 -0.013 -0.007 -0.070 -0.006 0.046 -0.027 -0.038 -0.017 
 (0.00) (0.07) . (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.96) (0.49) (0.70) (0.00) (0.76) (0.01) (0.14) (0.04) (0.35) 
SDROA 0.039 0.016 0.031 1.000 0.032 0.473 0.010 0.110 -0.022 -0.095 0.052 0.035 0.068 0.235 -0.037 0.008 -0.026 
 (0.03) (0.38) (0.09) . (0.08) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.66) (0.16) 
ROSChg 0.072 0.030 0.723 0.032 1.000 0.073 0.236 0.103 -0.002 0.000 0.015 -0.007 -0.006 0.035 -0.049 -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.08) . (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.92) (0.98) (0.42) (0.72) (0.74) (0.05) (0.01) (0.78) (0.61) 
SDROS -0.008 0.118 0.145 0.473 0.073 1.000 0.001 0.176 -0.077 -0.144 0.120 -0.055 0.065 0.213 -0.028 0.007 -0.031 
 (0.65) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) . (0.96) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.69) (0.09) 
EPSChg 0.238 -0.017 0.285 0.010 0.236 0.001 1.000 0.027 -0.023 0.010 -0.037 0.105 0.013 0.018 -0.064 -0.001 -0.006 
 (0.00) (0.35) (0.00) (0.57) (0.00) (0.96) . (0.14) (0.20) (0.60) (0.04) (0.00) (0.46) (0.34) (0.00) (0.95) (0.74) 
SDEPS -0.064 0.129 0.111 0.110 0.103 0.176 0.027 1.000 -0.032 0.045 0.076 -0.141 0.029 0.136 -0.015 0.007 -0.006 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) . (0.08) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.41) (0.72) (0.73) 
LnBoardSize 0.003 -0.060 0.001 -0.022 -0.002 -0.077 -0.023 -0.032 1.000 -0.068 -0.151 0.015 0.059 -0.025 0.010 -0.025 -0.003 
 (0.89) (0.00) (0.96) (0.22) (0.92) (0.00) (0.20) (0.08) . (0.00) (0.00) (0.40) (0.00) (0.17) (0.59) (0.18) (0.85) 
IndDir 0.004 0.012 -0.013 -0.095 0.000 -0.144 0.010 0.045 -0.068 1.000 -0.003 -0.043 0.076 0.208 -0.018 -0.201 0.037 
 (0.82) (0.50) (0.49) (0.00) (0.98) (0.00) (0.60) (0.01) (0.00) . (0.85) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) (0.04) 
Private -0.044 0.018 -0.007 0.052 0.015 0.120 -0.037 0.076 -0.151 -0.003 1.000 0.003 -0.023 0.030 0.023 0.015 0.097 
 (0.02) (0.33) (0.70) (0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.85) . (0.86) (0.20) (0.10) (0.20) (0.40) (0.00) 
LnAssetChg 0.184 -0.101 -0.070 0.035 -0.007 -0.055 0.105 -0.141 0.015 -0.043 0.003 1.000 -0.012 -0.138 0.353 -0.016 0.011 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.72) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.40) (0.02) (0.86) . (0.52) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.54) 
LnCost 0.065 0.007 -0.006 0.068 -0.006 0.065 0.013 0.029 0.059 0.076 -0.023 -0.012 1.000 0.193 -0.037 -0.042 0.032 
 (0.00) (0.70) (0.76) (0.00) (0.74) (0.00) (0.46) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.52) . (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.08) 
LnFirmAge 0.010 0.101 0.046 0.235 0.035 0.213 0.018 0.136 -0.025 0.208 0.030 -0.138 0.193 1.000 -0.077 -0.029 -0.107 
 (0.58) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.17) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) . (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) 
DAChg -0.035 0.004 -0.027 -0.037 -0.049 -0.028 -0.064 -0.015 0.010 -0.018 0.023 0.353 -0.037 -0.077 1.000 0.061 0.000 
 (0.05) (0.83) (0.14) (0.04) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00) (0.41) (0.59) (0.31) (0.20) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) . (0.00) (0.99) 
MBChg 0.311 0.050 -0.038 0.008 -0.005 0.007 -0.001 0.007 -0.025 -0.201 0.015 -0.016 -0.042 -0.029 0.061 1.000 -0.020 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.04) (0.66) (0.78) (0.69) (0.95) (0.72) (0.18) (0.00) (0.40) (0.37) (0.02) (0.11) (0.00) . (0.27) 
DirHolding -0.016 0.018 -0.017 -0.026 -0.009 -0.031 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 0.037 0.097 0.011 0.032 -0.107 0.000 -0.020 1.000 
 (0.39) (0.32) (0.35) (0.16) (0.61) (0.09) (0.74) (0.73) (0.85) (0.04) (0.00) (0.54) (0.08) (0.00) (0.99) (0.27) . 
Foreign 0.018 0.039 0.005 0.048 -0.017 -0.005 0.008 0.089 0.075 0.035 -0.099 -0.055 0.234 0.158 -0.034 0.017 -0.020 
 (0.32) (0.03) (0.77) (0.01) (0.34) (0.80) (0.68) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.36) (0.27)             
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Table 3 
Determinants of Compensation and Relative Compensation 
LnCOMP is the log value of the average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors. RelCOMP is the ratio of 
the average annual compensation of the three highest paid directors to the average annual salary of an employee (total cash 
paid to employees to total number of employees). AbnCOMP is abnormal compensation. RET is industry-adjusted 
cumulative daily raw return for the year. SDRET is the standard deviation of the daily raw return for the year. ROA is 
industry-adjusted return on assets. SDROA is the standard deviation of return on assets for five years. LnBoardSize is the 
log value of the number of directors on the board. IndDir is the percentage of the number of independent directors to total 
number of directors on the board. Private is a dummy variable which is coded 1 if the firm is a privately owned firm and 0 
otherwise. LnAsset is the log value of total assets. LnCost is the log value of the living expenditure level of the province 
where the firm is located. LnFirmAge is the log value of the number of years the firm has been established. DirHolding is 
the percentage of director shareholdings to total shares outstanding. Foreign is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 











Intercept -2.2002 -1.6007 -12.5960 -11.6987 -0.7157 -0.5667 
 (-2.76) (-2.12) (-1.87) (-1.91) (-3.26) (-2.81) 
RET 0.2426  0.8759  0.0393  
 (4.49)**  (2.26)*  (2.73)**  
SDRET -8.1400  -21.1974  -0.9892  
 (-3.42)**  (-1.48)  (-2.26)*  
ROA  3.2560  7.1778  0.5604 
  (11.50)**  (3.40)**  (6.70)** 
SDROA  -1.1842  -2.4824  0.0425 
  (-1.69)  (-0.53)  (0.24) 
LnBoardSize 0.1831 0.1927 1.5749 1.5243 0.0374 0.0385 
 (2.33)* (2.49)* (3.07)** (2.96)** (1.31) (1.38) 
IndDir 0.1911 0.0993 0.6836 0.3317 0.0493 0.0305 
 (0.82) (0.45) (0.48) (0.23) (0.78) (0.50) 
Private 0.1148 0.1191 1.7515 1.7404 0.0316 0.0319 
 (2.54)* (2.75)** (4.98)** (5.04)** (2.60)** (2.69)** 
LnAsset 0.2875 0.2651 0.8609 0.8468 0.0488 0.0432 
 (10.65)** (10.38)** (4.04)** (4.21)** (7.10)** (7.10)** 
LnCost 0.7403 0.7048 -0.6734 -0.7800 -0.0495 -0.0553 
 (10.55)** (10.10)** (-1.32) (-1.54) (-3.11)** (-3.53)**     
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 LnCOMP RelCOMP AbnCOMP
LnFirmAge -0.0887 -0.0591 -0.1367 -0.0870 -0.0181 -0.0163
 (-2.61)** (-1.78) (-0.52) (-0.33) (-1.70) (-1.46)
DA -0.0955 0.0917 1.2136 1.5470 -0.0403 -0.0001
 (-0.84) (0.85) (1.64) (2.16)* (-1.44) (0.00)
MB 0.0014 -0.0149 -0.1168 -0.1288 -0.0009 -0.0045
 (0.11) (-1.38) (-1.59) (-1.91) (-0.27) (-1.45)
DirHolding 1.5159 1.3237 11.2316 10.8209 0.2308 0.1928
 (4.68)** (4.13)** (1.55) (1.47) (2.12)* (1.79)
Foreign 0.1843 0.1570 0.8102 0.7222 0.0159 0.0125
 (2.57)** (2.21)* (1.21) (1.10) (0.50) (0.40)
Industry Dummies 
Included   
Year Dummies Included   
Adjusted R2 0.3425 0.3877 0.1026 0.1085 0.0555 0.0805
F-statistics 62.2296 75.4341 14.4471 15.3101 7.9060 11.2855
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    
 
* for significance at 0.05 level.   








 Sensitivities Elasticities 
Intercept 0.0068 0.0050 0.0066 0.0047 0.0070 -0.0050 0.0059 -0.0257
 (1.74) (1.30) (1.59) (1.15) (0.27) (-0.20) (0.20) (-1.01)
∆SW 0.0039  0.0038  
 (3.77)**  (3.54)**  
∆OI  0.0304 0.0287  
  (2.90)** (2.68)**  
∆SW*Private   0.0057  
   (1.72)  
∆OI*Private   0.0707  
   (1.33)  
∆LnSW   0.0677 0.0981 
   (2.14)* (1.45) 
∆LnOI   0.7100  0.7058
   (4.55)**  (6.19)**
∆LnSW*Private   -0.0548 
   (-0.80) 
∆LnOI*Private    0.0730
    (0.21)
Private   0.0023 0.0010 0.0133 0.0325
   (0.85) (0.42) (0.64) (1.84)
Adjusted R2 0.0272 0.0253 0.0277 0.0264 0.0429 0.0554 0.0436 0.0566
F-statistics 4.6105 4.3504 4.3917 4.2239 6.7901 8.1480 6.4154 8.1401
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 
* for significance at 0.05 level.   
** for significance at 0.01 level.   
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 Table 5 
Pay and Performance Sensitivities and Elasticities for Firms Located in More Developed Regions and 
Less Developed Regions 
Panel A: Firms Located in More Developed Regions 
Coefficient
(t-value)
 Sensitivities Elasticities 
Intercept  0.0060 0.0046 0.0279  -0.0235
  (1.13) (0.86) (0.93)  (-0.81)
∆SW  0.0038  
  (3.07)**  
∆OI   0.0345  
   (3.22)**  
∆SW*Private  0.0074  
  (1.83)  
∆OI*Private   0.0737  
   (1.15)  
∆LnSW   0.2086  
   (5.12)**  
∆LnOI    0.6136
    (5.43)**
∆LnSW*Private   -0.1720  
   (-3.80)**  
∆LnOI*Private    0.1192
    (0.32)
Private  0.0036 0.0018 0.0004  0.0355
  (1.00) (0.56) (0.02)  (1.70)
Adjusted R2  0.0292 0.0295 0.0438  0.0478
F-statistics  3.4638 3.4887 4.7439  5.1076
p-value  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
 
Panel B: Firms Located in Less Developed Regions 
Coefficient
(t-value)
 Sensitivities Elasticities 
Intercept  0.0067 0.0043 0.0022  -0.0325
  (1.17) (0.79) (0.04)  (-0.65)
∆SW  0.0045  
  (2.88)**  
∆OI   0.0099  
   (0.68)  
∆SW*Private  0.0005  
  (0.15)  
∆OI*Private   0.0406  
   (0.70)  
∆LnSW   0.0521  
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   (0.80)  
∆LnOI    0.9354
    (3.08)**
∆LnSW*Private   0.1718  
   (1.40)  
∆LnOI*Private    0.0893
    (0.13)
Private  0.0025 0.0022 0.0503  0.0313
  (0.68) (0.75) (1.12)  (0.94)
Adjusted R2  0.0213 0.0130 0.0492  0.0708
F-statistics  1.7887 1.4800 2.8785  3.7682




An Analysis of Perk Compensation 
LnPERK is log value of perk compensation. AbnPERK is abnormal perk. Perk compensation includes administrative 
expenses, traveling expenses, business entertainment expenses, communication expenses, overseas training expenses, 
director meeting expenses, driver expenses and bonus for directors. RET is industry-adjusted cumulative daily raw return 
for the year. SDRET is the standard deviation of the daily raw return for the year. ROA is industry-adjusted return on assets. 
SDROA is the standard deviation of return on assets for five years. LnBoardSize is the log value of the number of directors 
on the board. IndDir is the percentage of the number of independent directors to total number of directors on the board. 
Private is a dummy variable which is coded 1 if the firm is a privately owned firm and 0 otherwise. LnAsset is the log value 
of total assets. LnCost is the log value of the living expenditure level of the province where the firm is located. LnFirmAge 
is the log value of the number of years the firm has been established. DirHolding is the percentage of director shareholdings 
to total shares outstanding. Foreign is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the firm issues B-shares or H-shares 
and 0 otherwise. t-statistics are computed using robust standard errors. 
 Beta Coefficient (t-statistics) 
 LnPERK N=3579 
AbnPERK 
N=3575 
Intercept 9.6811 5.6412 -0.9128 -0.1044 
 (1.17) (0.68) (-0.09) (-0.01) 
RET 0.3073  -0.4388  
 (0.61)  (-0.71)  
SDRET -57.9540  -13.9901  
 (-3.25)**  (-0.63)  
ROA  -0.4220  0.5351 
  (-0.16)  (0.19) 
SDROA  5.9697  -2.5539 
  (0.79)  (-0.38) 
LnBoardSize -0.7282 -0.7404 -0.1920 -0.1596 
 (-0.95) (-0.97) (-0.24) (-0.20) 
IndDir -3.4052 -3.5664 7.4153 7.4457 
 (-1.49) (-1.55) (1.38) (1.38) 
Private -0.8229 -0.7717 0.7739 0.8128 
 (-1.95) (-1.82) (1.53) (1.60) 
LnAsset -0.3922 -0.2484 0.1585 0.1405 
 (-1.36) (-0.89) (0.44) (0.39) 
LnCost 0.7671 0.6989 -0.3903 -0.4579 
 (1.09) (0.98) (-0.53) (-0.60) 
LnFirmAge 1.0526 1.0009 0.3298 0.3909 
 (3.06)** (2.78)** (0.86) (0.96) 
DA 1.9528 1.4039 1.9993 1.9863 
 (1.63) (1.20) (1.95) (1.99)* 
MB -0.1015 -0.0967 0.1700 0.1496 
 (-0.80) (-0.81) (0.81) (0.75) 
DirHolding -8.6851 -8.7245 -4.4290 -4.2727 
 (-1.92) (-1.96)* (-1.42) (-1.37) 
Foreign -0.5456 -0.6485 0.3939 0.3597 
 (-0.73) (-0.85) (0.49) (0.45) 
Industry Dummies Included    
Year Dummies Included    
Adjusted R2 0.0446 0.0428 0.0127 0.0123 
F-statistics 5.6468 5.4442 2.2837 2.2385 
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
* for significance at 0.05 level.   
** for significance at 0.01 level.   
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Table 7 
Perk and performance Sensitivities and Elasticities 
Coefficient
(t-value)
 Sensitivity Elasticity 
Intercept  0.0159 0.0166 0.4064  0.3792
  (2.10) (2.23) (0.97)  (0.92)
∆SW  -0.0012  
  (-0.49)  
∆OI   0.0099  
   (0.76)  
∆SW*Private  0.0124  
  (1.13)  
∆OI*Private   0.0932  
   (1.06)  
∆LnSW   0.1350  
   (0.39)  
∆LnOI    -0.3825
    (-0.20)
∆LnSW*Private   -0.1716  
   (-0.34)  
∆LnOI*Private    -1.7018
    (-0.35)
Private  0.0096 0.0046 -0.4745  -0.4308
  (1.53) (1.15) (-1.28)  (-1.10)
Adjusted R2  0.0001 0.0001 0.0002  0.0001
F-statistics  0.7491 0.7652 0.8805  0.8845
p-value  0.80 0.78 063  0.63
 
 
